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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. forces arrested Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003, less than a
week after Iraq's transitional Governing Council voted to establish its own
tribunal to try Iraqi nationals on charges of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and stipulated violations of Iraqi law.' Saddam's arrest
catapulted the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity2 (Iraqi
Special Tribunal) into the spotlight, and Iraqi officials quickly indicated their
intent to try Saddam themselves.' The decision to try Saddam before the Iraqi
Special Tribunal has generated much criticism. Human rights organizations
are skeptical about the ability of Iraqi judges to handle a complex trial without
international assistance and, regardless of that ability, believe that broad
international participation is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of the trial.4
This Note addresses the question of whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal is
a suitable venue in which to try Saddam. During the last decade, hybrid
domestic-international tribunals have emerged as an alternative to purely
international or domestic tribunals. In theory, hybrid tribunals combat the
limitations of purely domestic or international tribunals, most notably
* J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2005; B.A., Emory University, 2000.
Bruce Zagaris, Iraq Governing Council Establish [sic] Special Tribunal and Saddam
Hussein is Arrested, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 76, 76 (2004).
2 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIALTRIBUNAL, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human__ights/
Statute.htm.
' Peter Slevin, Iraqi Governing Council Says It Wants to Try Hussein, WASH. POST, Dec.
15, 2003, at A9, 2003 WL 67893793.
4 See, e.g., Letter from Michael Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, to Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Head of the Iraqi Governing Council (Dec. 22, 2003), at http:/
www.humanrightsfirst.org/internationaLjustice/W-context/tr council.doc (last visited Sept.
26, 2004).
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problems of capacity-building5 and of achieving both domestic and interna-
tional legitimacy.6 International tribunals have been criticized for not doing
more to rebuild the local judiciary, while analysts have questioned the ability
of local institutions to issue fair verdicts when trying members of an ousted
regime.7
This Note examines the plan to try Saddam before the Iraqi Special
Tribunal in light of the goals of capacity-building and legitimacy, and
concludes that broader international participation is necessary to achieve those
aims. Section II briefly addresses the nature of the allegations lodged against
Saddam.8 Section III examines hybrid tribunals as vehicles for the trial of
serious international crimes and also briefly considers the tribunals installed
in East Timor and Sierra Leone. Section IV analyzes the Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, paying particular attention to the need for capacity-building
in Iraq and the goal of internationally-acknowledged legitimacy. This Note
ultimately concludes that, while the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal may
adequately provide for capacity-building and legitimacy in the trials of lesser
figures, broader international participation is required to ensure that Saddam's
trial is fair enough to withstand international and historical scrutiny.
Moreover, capacity-building will probably be undermined by a purely
domestic trial. Thus, given current international and political realities, some
version of a hybrid tribunal is the most appropriate forum for Saddam's trial.
Capacity-building is enhancing the development of the local justice system through local
participation in the tribunal. See Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The
Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 36-37 (2002).
6 See, e.g., id. at 33 ("[H]ybrid domestic-international courts may have greater legitimacy
in the adjudication of serious human rights crimes than either purely domestic trials... or purely
international processes ... .
Sld. at 33-37.
It is impossible to address, within the scope of this Note, all of the human rights violations
allegedly committed by the Iraqi government. See generally Prosecuting Iraqi War Crimes: A
Consideration of the Different Forum Options: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 108th Cong. 50-55 (2003) (statement by Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy
Director, Human Rights Watch) (detailing a multitude of alleged human rights violations),
available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/_files/shrg 1081 74iraqiwarcrimes-forum.pdf (last visited
Dec. 28, 2004).
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II. SADDAM AND IRAQI CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Saddam first became involved in politics at the age of nineteen when he
joined the Ba'ath (meaning renaissance)9 Party.' ° After participating in a
botched assassination attempt against Iraqi Prime Minister General Abdel-
Karim Qassem in 1959, Saddam was forced to flee the country for several
years." Saddam's true rise to power began when he returned to help engineer
a successful coup in 1963, with help from Iraqi generals and the United States
Central Intelligence Agency, which approved of the Ba'athists' anticommunist
stance. 2 However, the Iraqi generals consolidated power for themselves and
imprisoned many Ba'athists. 13 Five years later, under the leadership of Ahmad
Hassan Al Bakr, Saddam's cousin, the Ba'athists staged a second successful
coup. 4 Saddam, as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), s was in charge of the state security apparatus and used his position to
form a vast network of secret police to crack down on dissidents and party-
opponents. 6
Bakr's health began deteriorating in the mid-1970s, and he "increasingly
turned over power to Saddam.... By 1977 the party bureaus, the intelligence
mechanisms, and even ministers who, according to the Provisional Constitu-
tion, should have reported to Bakr, reported to Saddam Husayn [sic]."' 7 When
9 The Ba'athists sought to acquire modem technology while maintaining their Arab
heritage. Eliot Marshall, Saddam: King of Terror, SMITHSONiAN, Apr. 2003, at 124, 124 (book
review).
1o Jessica Moore, Saddam Hussein s Rise to Power, Online NewsHour, at http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/middle.east/iraq/war/playerl .html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
t Id.
12 Marshall, supra note 9, at 124.
13 Id.
'4 Frontline, The Long Road to War: Chronology, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/longroad/etc/cron.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
"s The RCC had exercised executive and legislative powers since it was first formed in July
1968. Country Studies, Iraq: Government: The Revolutionary Command Council, at http://
countrystudies.us/iraq/71.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). The chairman of the RCC was
President of the Republic and Saddam, as vice chairman, was first in the line of succession. Id.
16 Frontline, supra note 14.
'" GlobalSecurity.org, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/iraq/saddam.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
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Bakr stepped down in 1979,18 Saddam assumed the presidency and quickly
demonstrated his now legendary brutality.
There followed an infamous purge, in which the new president
staged a confession of treason by the Baathist Party chairman
during an official conference. As party members were de-
nounced one by one from the podium, they were led from the hall
before the eyes of terrified colleagues to be executed.... Hussein
recorded the entire proceedings... on videotape, which he then
ordered circulated. 9
In addition to such evidence of politically-motivated killings, a great deal
of evidence has come to light over the years indicating torture of civilians,
generally directed at the Kurdish minority20 or anyone who did not show
loyalty to Saddam.21 Much of this evidence comes from personal accounts of
those who survived, or whose relatives disappeared in the night.2" The
evidence of human rights violations is not limited, however, to anecdotal
accounts. In May 1992 and August 1993, following uprisings by Kurdish
fighters, eighteen tons of official Iraqi state documents were shipped by the
Kurds to the United States for safekeeping and analysis. 23 Analysis of the
18 It is widely speculated that Bakr's retirement was involuntary. See, e.g., The Iraq
Foundation, Biography of Saddam Hussein of Tikrit ("On July 16, 1979[, a]t the age of 42,
Saddam forces AI-Bakr to retire and is sworn in as President of the Republic of Iraq.... In
1982, former President Bakr dies mysteriously. It is widely suspected that Saddam is
involved."), at http://www.iraqfoundation.org/research/bio.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
1" Marshall, supra note 9, at 125. Twenty-two people, most or all of whom Saddam
considered rivals, were executed, including five of Saddam's fellow members of the RCC.
Moore, supra note 10.
20 Approximately 15-20% of Iraq's nearly twenty-five million people are Kurdish. U.S.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Iraq, in THE WoRLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/iz.html#People (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
21 See, e.g., Report: Iraq Torture Chamber Found, CNN, Apr. 2,2003, at http://www.cnn.
com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/02/sprj.irq.iraq.torture/index.htm; see generally HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Iraq andIraqi Kurdistan, in WORLD REPoRT 2002 (presenting a collection of reports
on Iraqi human rights dating back to 1990), http://hrw.org/wr2k2/mena4.html (last visited Dec.
28,2004).
22 The White House has collected many Iraqi "stories of brutality, torture, fear, and death"
and made them available on its website. Iraq: Special Report, Tales of Saddam's Brutality, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/iraq/20030920-4.html (last modified Sept.
20, 2003).
23 The documents were acquired from government buildings, including intelligence agencies
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documents, conducted by Middle East Watch,24 led to a report published by
Human Rights Watch 25 that sought to establish the genocidal intent of the Iraqi
Government against the Kurds. According to the report, the documents
provide "unequivocal evidence... of Iraq's repeated use of chemical weapons
against the Kurds" in the late 1980s. 27 "The documents are crystal clear ... on
the issue of culpability for the chemical attack on Halabja on March 16,
1988.,,2' The attack on Halabja is, perhaps, the best-known chemical attack
launched during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds.29
Between 40,000 and 50,000 people were living there at the
time.... During three days, the town and surrounding district
were attacked with conventional bombs, artillery fire, and
chemicals-including mustard gas and nerve agents (Sarin,
Tabun, and VX). At least 5,000 people died immediately as a
result of the chemical attack and it is estimated that up to 12,000
people died during those three days.3"
The attack on Halabja was one in a series of chemical attacks. Other
allegedly genocidal activities included mass executions, razing of villages,
forced relocation of Kurds, and economic blockades to cut villages off from
and Ba'ath Party branches, during a popular uprising in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq in
1991. Human Rights Watch, Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own
Words, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/l994/iraq/TEXT.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
2" Middle East Watch is a division of Human Rights Watch.
2' The largest U.S.-based human rights organization, Human Rights Watch is composed of
academics, lawyers, journalists, and country experts who conduct investigations into, and publish
reports of, human rights abuses throughout the world. Human Rights Watch, About HRW- Who
We Are, at http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
26 Human Rights Watch, supra note 23.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, directed the Anfal campaign, earning the
nickname "Chemical Ali" because of his use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish
towns and villages. Carole A. O'Leary, The Kurds ofIraq: Recent History, Future Prospects,
MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L AFF. J., Dec. 2002, at 17-18 (reporting that "AI-Anfal (The Spoils) was
the codename given to an aggressive, planned, military operation against Iraqi Kurds. It was part
of an ongoing, larger campaign against Kurds because of their struggle to gain autonomy within
the Republic of Iraq."), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4a5.html (lastvisited Sept.
26,2004).
30 Id.
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support.31 "In all phases of the ethnic cleansing program, which began when
the Baath Party first seized power in 1963 and culminated in the Anfal
operation, it is estimated that more than 4000 villages in rural Kurdistan were
destroyed and perhaps 300,000 people perished. 32
The alleged crimes of Saddam's forces are not limited to those committed
against Iraqi citizens. The regime is also accused of committing human rights
violations during the war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait. Iraq allegedly
used chemical weapons extensively during the Iran-Iraq war, killing an
estimated 20,000 Iranians with mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and
sarin.33 Both countries repeatedly accused the other of using chemical
weapons, while denying their own use of such weapons.34 However, the
reported Iraqi chemical attack at Hoor-ul-Huzwaizeh on March 13, 1984, was
quickly and "conclusively verified by an international team of specialists
dispatched.., by the United Nations Secretary General." 35
During the first three months of Iraq's annexation and occupation of the
state of Kuwait in 1991, an estimated 5000 Kuwaiti citizens were arrested and
600 were killed.36 Detainees reported widespread and systematic torture, such
as threats of execution and use of electric shock.37 A report, declassified by
the Pentagon and submitted to the UN Security Council, revealed, among other
things, the discovery by the U.S. military of"at least two dozen [Iraqi] torture
sites in Kuwait City, most of which were [in] police stations or sports
31 Id.
32 Id.
13 Malinowski, supra note 8 (noting that "Both Iran (1929) and Iraq (1931) are parties to the
Geneva Protocol that prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials, or devices, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.
The use of... prohibited gases is a war crime.").
" David B. Merkin, Note, The Efficacy of Chemical-Arms Treaties in the Aftermath of the
Iran-Iraq War, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 175, 184 (1991).
15 Julian Perry Robinson & Jozef Goldblat, FactSheet: Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran
War, STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RES. INST. (May 1984) (reporting that "[flrom an unexploded
bomb found at an Iraqi-attack site, the UN team drew a sample which its analysts in Sweden and
Switzerland later found to be high-quality mustard gas"), http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/
factsheet- I 984.html (last updated Oct. 1, 1998).
36 Human Rights in Iraq and Iraqi-Occupied Kuwait: Hearing Before the House Foreign
Affairs Comm., 102d Cong. (1991) (testimony of Andrew Whitley, Executive Director, Middle
East Watch), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/l991/IRAQ91.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
37 Id.
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facilities."3 Similar facilities have been discovered inside Iraq.39 Aside from
the discovery of torture facilities, the report presents, in sometimes shocking
detail, evidence of atrocities committed against Kuwaiti citizens gathered
through "written and videotaped accounts from rape and torture victims,
photographs of murdered Kuwaitis, and videotapes of burial sites and torture
implements."4
With the discovery of similar torture facilities in Iraq came similar stories
of brutalities carried out against Iraqi civilians who, prior to the fall of
Saddam, were understandably afraid to speak out against the regime. Evidence
of these atrocities continues to be discovered in Iraq and presented to the
world.4 Perhaps to drive home the point made by print articles, the Pentagon
declassified a video taken by an Iraqi man, who claimed to have been involved
in the taping of many similar videos, that shows acts of torture-such as
tossing bound men off rooftops-and executions carried out by what appear
to be Saddam Fedayeen42 fighters.43 Reportedly, "similar tapes have been
found in Iraqi prisons, military facilities and even the private video collections
of Uday and Qusay, Saddam's sons, who were killed by U.S. forces in a
dramatic July shootout."
U.S. forces captured Saddam on December 13,2003, in a small village near
Tikrit.45 Iraqis quickly promised that Saddam would receive a fair trial before
the Iraqi Special Tribunal.46 On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing
3 Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) (Unclassified Version), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25441 (1993).
31 See, e.g., CNN, supra note 21.
4 Report on Iraqi War Crimes, supra note 38.
4 In the three months following the end of the 2003 war, over sixty mass graves were found
in Iraq. Associated Press, Another Mass Grave Found in Iraq, July 18, 2003, http//www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92237,00.html. Some of the graves contained hundreds of bodies,
including women and children, and one grave held over 3000 bodies. Id; Scheherezade
Faramarzi, 3,000Bodies Exhumed at Iraq Mass Grave, ASSOCIATEDPRESS, May 14,2003,2003
WL 55371393.
4' The Saddam Fedayeen (Saddam's "Men of Sacrifice") were a politically reliable and
intensely loyal paramilitary force outside the chain of military command. GlobalSecurity.org,
Saddam's Martyrs ["Men of Sacrifice"] Fedayeen Saddam, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
intell/world/iraq/fedayeen.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
4' Bret Baier & Ian McCaleb, Videotape Shows Saddam 's Men TorturingIraqis, FOXNEWS,
Oct. 31, 2003, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933, 101689,00.html.
44Id.
" Saddam 'Caught Like a Rat' in a Hole, CNN, Dec. 15, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/meast/12/14/sprj.irq.saddam.operation/index.html.
46 Saddam to Face War Crimes Tribunal, CNN, Dec. 14, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Council issued a law establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Iraqis on
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of
stipulated Iraqi laws.47 However, in the interests ofjustice and legitimacy, the
Iraqi Special Tribunal is not the most appropriate forum for Saddam's trial.
As argued below,4 the Iraqi judiciary simply does not have the expertise to
carry out so complex a trial in a manner that will withstand international
scrutiny. Instead Saddam should be tried before a hybrid tribunal, while the
Iraqi Special Tribunal should focus on lower-level Ba'ath Party members.
III. HYBRID TRIBUNALS: BACKGROUND
The hybrid tribunal is a recently-developed vehicle for accountability and
reconciliation for human rights violations.49 Accountability and reconciliation
through criminal prosecution is important for a number of reasons. Many
argue that criminal punishment is the most effective insurance against future
repression and that revealing the truth about past human rights violations, and
condemning them, "can deter potential lawbreakers and inoculate the public
against future temptation to be complicit in state-sponsored violence. Trials
may, as well, inspire societies that are reexamining their basic values to affirm
the fundamental principles of respect for the rule of law and for the inherent
dignity of individuals."5 There is disagreement, however, as to who should
dole out such punishment. Some argue that governments should prosecute
their predecessors because the trials can assist the transition to democracy by
demonstrating that no one is above the law.51 Similarly, the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court states that "it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes."" The counterargument is that new democracies emerging from
2003/WORLD/meast/l 2/14/sprj.nirq.saddam.fiture/index.html.
4' THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2.
48 See discussion infra Part VA-B.
49 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International
Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2003).
" Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
ofa Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991) (citation omitted).
"' Id. at 2543, 2544-45 (discussing the arguments for and against this position).
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999. "[T]he Court's jurisdiction is complementary to national
criminal jurisdiction and was never intended to be applicable in all situations. It is a court of last
resort that can only operate when a state with jurisdiction cannot or will not act." Anne K.
Heindel, The Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal
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dictatorship are polarized and fragile and may not be able to withstand the
effects of a high profile, politically-charged trial."
Hybrid tribunals essentially split the difference by employing local actors
to the extent possible-so as to assist the transition to democracy and the
healing process-and involving international figures to help achieve justice.
Hybrid tribunals are courts where both the institution and the law it applies are
mixtures of the domestic and the international.54 Panels of international and
local judges try cases prosecuted and defended by international and local
lawyers. 55 The applicable law is domestic law modified to conform to
international standards.56 The United Nations has recently installed hybrid
tribunals in East Timor, Kosovo,s7 and Sierra Leone, and plans are underway
to establish a hybrid court in Cambodia.5 8 The hybrid tribunal has been
advanced, in part, as a reaction to criticisms of purely international tribunals
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The essential
purpose of a hybrid tribunal is to prosecute those responsible for crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law while addressing some of the problems and criticisms faced
by purely international tribunals.5 9 Such criticisms include cost,6° a failure to
Court, 2 SEArTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 345, 348-49 (2004).
" Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 2544.
14 Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 295 (2003).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 This section does not discuss the Kosovo tribunal because, unlike East Timor and Sierra
Leone, a hybrid tribunal was not implemented from the outset. Instead, the United Nations
employed international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo's domestic courts to help tackle the
substantial caseload of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See
Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the Creation of
Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107, 119
(2001).
" Dickinson, supra note 54, at 295.
'9 See Dickinson, supra note 54, at 305-08 (discussing the characteristics, benefits, and
problems of hybrid tribunals).
" The ICTY budget for 2002-2003 is over $223 million. International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/
factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last updated Sept. 23, 2004). The ICTR budget for 2002-2003 was
nearly $178 million. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information, http://
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
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help rebuild the local judiciary, and a legitimacy deficit from the perspective
of the civilians who are supposed to be made whole by the proceedings.6
While hybrid courts have received little analysis, they have been challenged
by supporters and critics of international courts alike.62 Advocates of formal
international judicial mechanisms-such as the International Criminal Court
(ICC)-fear that hybrid tribunals will be used, not only as an alternative to, but
also as a means to undermine purely international tribunals.63 .Such suspicions
have been expressed by Human Rights Watch;" David Scheffer, former U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues; and Hansjorg Strohmeyer,
Director of the Office of. Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations.65
Conversely, those who are wary of international judicial mechanisms, such as
members of President Bush's administration who oppose the ICC, may see
hybrid tribunals as carrying too many of the characteristics of international
courts.66 Proponents cite perceived advantages such as decreased costs,
legitimacy problems faced by purely international or domestic-tribunals, and
the goal of capacity-building as evidence of the superiority of hybrid courts
over purely international or domestic tribunals. These advantages, coupled
with the problems associated with having Iraqis conduct these trials, suggest
that Saddam should be tried before a hybrid tribunal instead, of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal.
61 See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Paradox ofInternationalAdjudication: Developments
in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World
Court, and the International Criminal Court, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 551, 589 (2000)
("[T]he ICTR has failed to communicate its accomplishments effectively to the people of
Rwanda. These failures, coupled with terrible pre-trial detention delays, have undermined the
perceived efficacy of the tribunal.").
62 See Dickinson, supra note 54, at 295-96.
63 Id. at 296.
' Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.N. Action on Sierra Leone Court Welcomed But
"Mixed" Tribunal Has Shortcomings (Aug. 14, 2000) (expressing concern about the possibility
of biased prosecutions and inadequate protections for the accused), http://www.hrw.org/press/
2000/08/s0814.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
65 Both Scheffer and Strohmeyer rejected the idea that hybrid courts should serve as models
for the future despite the fact that Strohmeyer contributed to the establishment of hybrid tribunals
in Kosovo and East Timor and Scheffer helped create the Special Court for Sierra Leone and was
"deeply involved" with the effort to create a hybrid court in Cambodia. See Dickinson, supra
note 54, at 310 n.4.
'Id. at 296.
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A. Hybrid Tribunals: East Timor
East Timor, home to the first hybrid tribunal, occupies approximately half
of an island between Australia and Indonesia.67 From 1976 to 1999, Indonesia
occupied East Timor, claiming it as a province. 6' Following a change in
Indonesian leadership, the East Timorese were given the opportunity to vote
on whether they preferred to become independent or to become an autonomous
region within the Republic of Indonesia. 69 The announcement of the results of
the referendum, in which 78.5% chose independence, incited widespread
violence and destruction, as the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian East
Timorese militias conducted a scorched-earth campaign as they withdrew.7"
Between March and June 2000, the United Nations Transitional Adminis-
tration in East Timor (UNTAET)71 passed regulations establishing the structure
of East Timor's court system. Three Special Panels, each composed of two
international judges and one East Timorese judge, were granted exclusive
jurisdiction over allegations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
torture, murder, and sexual offenses committed between January 1 and October
25, 1999.72
Three years later, the tribunal's proceedings have generated much criticism,
including allegations of due process violations,73 inadequate and underfunded
defenders,74 and inexperienced judges. 7' The causes of these serious problems
67 U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, East Timor, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.
cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.html#Geo (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
68 Id.
69 Megan A. Fairlie, Affirming Brahimi: East Timor Makes the Case for a Model Criminal
Code, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1059, 1063-64 (2003).
70 Approximately 600,000 East Timorese, 75% of the population, were uprooted from their
homes, and over 1000 civilians were killed. Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals:
Searchingfor Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 242, 249 (2003).
7' S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg. at 2,U.N. Doe. S/RES/1264 (1999).
72 Katzenstein, supra note 70, at 251.
13 See, e.g., JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE GENERAL PROSECUTOR V.
JONI MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS (THE Los PALOS CASE) 35 (Mar. 2002) (questioning the
impartiality of the Special Panels and the competence of defense counsel, and criticizing delays
and translation services), at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/Los%20Palos%20trial%20
report.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
"4 David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model
for the Future? (East-West Center, AsiaPacific Issues No. 61, Aug. 2002) (noting that no
defense witnesses were called in the first fourteen cases prosecuted), at http://eastwestcenter.org/
stored/pdfs/api06 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
" Katzenstein, supra note 70, at 253 (stating that "[In the cases that have been prosecuted
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include the inexperience of East Timorese lawyers and judges76 and a lack of
funding so severe that those prosecuted arguably were denied effective
counsel." Lack of funding also resulted in a strict deadline for ending
investigations that will prevent the tribunal from fully investigating and
prosecuting every case.7" In conjunction with the lack of experienced lawyers
and judges, the decision to quickly involve local actors in the judicial process,
coupled with an inadequate training and mentoring program, has been heavily
criticized.79
Despite these problems, the East Timor tribunal should not be written off
as a failure. As an arguably flawed first attempt, it offers lessons and
experience useable to improve on the hybrid model. The United Nations can
improve upon the East Timor model by ensuring adequate funding, by giving
primacy to capacity-building programs, and by reevaluating policy decisions. 0
"The decision to quickly transfer control of the [East Timorese] judiciary, for
instance, has been criticized only in retrospect. Its underlying motivation, to
encourage local autonomy and participation, is difficult to fault."'"
B. Hybrid Tribunals: Sierra Leone
The West African nation of Sierra Leone was ravaged by a nearly decade-
long civil war that began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
attempted to overthrow the government. 2 The war was characterized by
widespread executions, amputations, rape, slavery, forced prostitution, and the
extensive use of child soldiers."
and especially in the earlier ones, the judges neglected to apply international law or applied it
incorrectly, and handed down harsh sentences for low-level perpetrators").
76 Id. at 254-55.
77 Id. at 264.
7' East Timor: Special Crimes Deputy Prosecutor Admits Trials Flawed (Radio Australia
broadcast, June 28, 2002), available at http://www.etan.org/et2002b/june/23-30/28specal.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
79 See, e.g., Katzenstein, supra note 70, at 265-68.
0 Id. at 277.
81 Id.
82 Marissa Miraldi, Overcoming Obstacles of Justice: The Special Court of Sierra Leone,
19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 849, 849 (2003).
83 Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and ConflictingRelationship Between the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEv. L.J. 139, 139 (2003).
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Sierra Leone is unique in that it will have both a national Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and an international, UN-sanctioned,
Special Court."a Both the TRC and the Special Court are composed of
domestic and international figures.8 5
The Lome Accord, 6 a peace agreement brokered in July 1999, helped lead
"to the cessation of hostilities in January 2002.,87 The Lome Accord was
particularly controversial because it granted complete amnesty to all combat-
ants."8 Many Sierra Leoneans supported the amnesty, believing it was the only
way to avoid further war, while human rights groups criticized the agreement
for giving concessions to war criminals.8 9 The Lome Accord also established
the TRC, a fact-finding body whose principal objective is "to create an
impartial.., record of violations and abuses of human rights and international
humanitarian law."'  From the outset, the RUF refused to fully comply with
the Lome Accord.91 Their soldiers did not enter the disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration camps, and human rights abuses continued, including
the taking of several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage in May 2000.92 In
response, the United Nations Security Council authorized Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to negotiate with Sierra Leone's government to create the Special
Court.93
84 Id. at 143.
85 Id. at 145-46.
86 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lome Accord], http://www.sierra-leone.org/
lomeaccord.html.
87 Celina Schocken, Note, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Overview andRecommenda-
tions, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436, 436-40 (2002).
88 Article IX, Paragraph 3 of the Lome Accord provides:
[T]he Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial
action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or
CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as
members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the
signing of the present Agreement.
Lome Accord, supra note 86, art. IX, para. 3.
89 Schocken, supra note 87, at 441.
9' The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (Sierra Leone) § 6(1), http://www.
sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
9' Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathyfor Coming Anarchy: Building the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 391, 397 (2001).
9' Id. at 397-98.
9' S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
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The Special Court,94 which is the first international criminal tribunal to sit
in the country where the war crimes occurred," is charged with prosecuting the
"persons who bear -the greatest responsibility for serious: violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law., 96 Because of the
amnesty provision in the Lome Accord, temporal jurisdiction for international
crimes extends back to November 30, 1996, and temporal jurisdiction. for
crimes under Sierra Leonean law extends back to July 1999. 9' Some believed
that the Special Court will eventually try approximately twenty-four people.98
Because the Special Court was created by contractual agreement-the ICTY
and ICTR were products of the UN's Chapter VII powers-the Sierra Leonean
government and the UN were able to deal and compromise for provisions they
believed appropriate.99 Thus, the Sierra Leonean government has the power
to select one of every three trial chamber judges and two of every five
appellate chamberjudges, as well as administrators and other staffmembers.100
The Special Court improved some problems faced by the East Timor
tribunal. The Special Court is better funded than the East Timor tribunal,
although it does face some constraints, and is comparatively well-staffed and
well-equipped.'' The Special Court also improved on capacity-building by
focusing more on side-by-side working arrangements and less on abstract
classroom discussions and workshops.'0 2 Nevertheless, the Special Court has
also been the subject of debate and criticism. Groups of amputees are
boycotting the Special Court because they allege that victims of the atrocities
have been largely overlooked and also that the Lome Accord provisions for
amputee victims are being ignored by the Sierra Leonean government and the
4 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http://www.sierra-leone.org/
specialcourtstatute.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
" Schocken, supra note 87, at 437.
96 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 94, art. 1.
17 Schocken, supra note 87, at 443.
98 E.g., Tejan-Cole, supra note 83, at 148 n.46 (While neither the UN, the Sierra Leonean
Government, nor "Court officials have confirmed or denied this figure.... Deputy Registrar of
the Court, Robert Kirkwood, was quoted on the Sierra Leone Web as stating that the new court
building will have [twenty-six] cells and that all of the accused will be held in individual cells.").
" Daniel J. Macaluso, Note, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect oftheAmnesty Provision
in the Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2001).
"0 Tejana-Cole, supra note 83, at 145-46.
... Katzenstein, supra note 70, at 278.
.02 See Dickinson, supra note 54, at 307.
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Special Court.'0 3 Moreover, reaching some of the accused may be problematic
as the Special Court, unlike-the ICTR, ICTY, or ICC, does not have the power
to demand extradition from a third country. " Additionally, questions arise as
to the relationship between the Special Court and the TRC. Nothing in the
TRC prevents testimony given there from being used in a prosecution by the
Special Court."'
Because the earliest indictments by the Special Court were in March 2003,
the trials before the Special Court have only just begun."°  Thus, the
international community will have to wait and watch as the trials unfold before
commenting on the Special Court's success as a fair and legitimate body.
Regardless of whether one considers previous hybrid tribunals successes
or failures, they are significant to the current situation in Iraq in that they have
provided the international community with experience in conducting complex
trials and in designing the tribunals themselves.
IV. THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
On December 9, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council voted to establish the
Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Iraqis for genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and stipulated violations of Iraqi laws.0 7 This tribunal will have
jurisdiction over crimes committed from July 17, 1968 (the day the Ba'ath
Party seized power) through May 1, 2003 (the day President Bush declared
major hostilities over).'0 8 Thus, the Iraqi Special Tribunal will try cases
stemming from several distinct operations including the initial purge of Bakr's
regime, the Anfal Campaign, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait. 9
At this point, it is difficult to guess how many Iraqis will be tried by this body;
however, given the breadth of jurisdiction, the number may be well into the
thousands." 0 Many Iraqis who did not appear in the deck of fifty-five cards
'0 Miraldi, supra note 82, at 857.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 94.
0 Schocken, supra note 87, at 456.
106 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Cases, athttp://www.sc-sl.org (lastvisited Oct. 19,2004).
'07 Zagaris, supra note 1, at 76; see also THE STATUTE OFTHE IRAQI SPECIALTRIBUNAL, supra
note 2, arts. 11-14.
'08 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, art. 1(b).
... See Hamza Hendawi, New Tribunal Might be Option for Saddam, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 14,2003, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/14/new-tribunal
_might-be-option-for-saddam/.
"0 As of December 2003, the Coalition Authority held over 5000 "people in detention
centers, but it [is unknown] bow many of those are war crimes suspects." Id.
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will be subject to prosecution before the court,"' and thousands of complaints
against members of the former regime have already.been filed."' Iraqi
Governing Council member Mahmoud Othman said that "[a]nybody against
whom a complaint is filed with evidence against them could. be tried.""' 3
However, more recently, Salem Chalabi, General Director of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, indicated that only 100 people, including Saddam, would be put on
trial.'14
In addition to the scores of low-level Ba'ath Party members who may be
tried before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Iraqi Governing Council has
announced its intent to prosecute Saddam."' Iraqi officials seem committed
to prosecuting Saddam without the assistance of international judges." 6 The
original Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal did not even include a provision
for involvement of international judges in the trials" 7 until "[t]he Governing
Council yield[ed]-at the last minute to the urging of U.S. authorities."' 118 Many
human rights organizations have questioned whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal
can handle such a complicated trial without the assistance of the international
community." 9
A number of experts, such as professor Diane Orentlicher, director of the
War Crimes Research Office at American University's Washington College of
Law, argue for the use of a judicial hybrid more closely modeled on the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2 Indeed, there are some significant
" In April 2003 the U.S. distributed to soldiers a list of the fifty-five most wanted Iraqis in
the form of a deck of cards. U.S. Issues Card Showing Iraqi's Most- Wanted List, BAIT. SUN,
Apr. 12, 2003, at 12A, 2003 WL 17685948.
... Associated Press, Iraq to Create War Crimes Tribunal in Coming Days, Dec. 5, 2003
(reporting that "One group in Baghdad, the Iraqi Human Rights Society, took in 7,000
complaints before the paperwork overwhelmed its staff'), http://www.USAToday.com/news/
world/iraq/2003-12-05-iraq-tribunaLx.htm.
113 Id.
..4 Associated Press, US., Tribunal Disagree on Saddam Handoff, May 11, 2004, http:/!
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,119623,00.html.
..5 See Slevin, supra note 3.
..6 See Scheherezade Faramarzi, Iraqi Judges Get Trained for War Crimes, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 4, 2004, http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/7632651.htm.
II7 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, art. 4(d).
18 Slevin, supra note 3.
119 See, e.g., Human Rights First, Prosecuting Saddam Hussein: A Conversation withFiona
McKay, Director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights First (Dec. 19, 2003),
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.orginternationajustice/w-context/w-cont-l I .htm.
120 See NewsHour: Trying Saddam Hussein (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 2003), at
http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/iniddle-east/july-dec03/iraq- 12-1 6.html (last visited Oct. 19,
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differences between the Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Special Court. Most
notably, the Iraqi Special Tribunal does not mandate the involvement of
international judges and prosecutors."' Instead, the law assumes all trial,
appellate, and investigative judges, as well as all prosecutors, will be Iraqi
nationals. 2 "The Governing Council. . ., if it deems necessary, can appoint
[experienced] non-Iraqi [trial and appellate] judges," but is under no obligation
to do so.' 2 ' There are, however, requirements that non-Iraqis be appointed "to
act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial Chambers and to the
Appeals Chamber."' 24 Similar provisions mandate the appointment of non-
Iraqi advisors or observers of investigative judges and prosecutors.'25
Human rights organizations point out that the Iraqi Special Tribunal's
requirement of international advisors and observers, with only the possibility
of international judges, is not comparable to the Special Court's mandatory
appointment of international judges and prosecutors with relevant experience
to work alongside Sierra Leoneans. 26 Such organizations argue that the Iraqi
Special Tribunal should be designed to more closely resemble the Special
Court."' Although the Iraqi Special Tribunal arguably can, without modifica-
tion, effectively prosecute most Iraqis, international figures must be utilized
for the prosecution of Saddam. The complexity and importance of Saddam's
trial demands the participation of international judges with experience and
expertise in the field of crimes against humanity.
A. The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Capacity-Building
The trial of Iraqis on allegations of human rights violations by an Iraqi
court will do much to help restore the system and can serve as the foundation
for what becomes, in the future, an independent and credible judicial system
2004).
"I Human Rights Watch, Saddam Hussein's Trial: Bringing Justicefor the Human Rights
Crimes in Iraq's Past (Dec. 2003), at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2003/l2/19/iraq6770.
htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
122 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, arts. 4(d), 7(h), and 8(j).
12 Id. art. 4(d).
124 Id. art. 6(b).
125 Id. arts. 7(n), 8(j).
126 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 121.
127 Cf Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Law Creating War Crimes Tribunal Flawed
(Dec. 11, 2003) (recommending various changes to the law creating the Iraqi Special Tribunal),
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/iraq I21103.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
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reminiscent of pre-Saddam Iraq. 28 However,.the trial of Saddam will unduly
burden the Iraqi Special Tribunal while contributing little, if anything, to
capacity-building. Trying Saddam will not benefit the capacity of the Iraqi
judiciary because thetrial will be much longer and more complex than any trial
they will encounter in the future. Moreover, participating in Saddam's trial
will severely narrow the experience a judge receives over the course of the
Iraqi Special Tribunal's operation.
Hybrid tribunals offer at least a partial response to the problem of
inadequate capacity-building by purely domestic or international institutions. 129
An international court that excludes local participation does little to train local
actors in necessary skills and does not help improve the ability of the local
population to staff and run its ownjudicial system. 3 Conversely, transferring
complete control over to an inexperienced judiciary without training yields
questionablejustice. Logically, the condition ofthe local judiciary dictates the
necessity of capacity-building. If a strong judiciary was largely unaffected by
the human rights violations at issue, then capacity-building may be viewed as
a lesser concern. In post-conflict situations, the local judiciary is often left in
shambles. 3 '
In Kosovo, for example, politically and ethnically motivated appointments,
removals, and training begat ajudiciary in which only thirty of the 756 judges
and prosecutors were Kosovar Albanian.'32 The previous regime had
attempted to exterminate the Kosovar Albanian population and, when it fell,
many non-Albanians, including the Serb and Montenegrin lawyers who had
administered Kosovo'sjustice system for the previous decade, quickly fled the
country.'33 The few judges and prosecutors who stayed soon received death
threats, as they were considered allied with the previous regime. 34
The capacity deficit in East Timor was even more severe than that faced by
Kosovo. The conflict between the Indonesians and the East Timorese virtually
eliminated the entire physical infrastructure of court buildings, prisons, and
12 See Faramarzi, supra note 116 ("Iraqis refer to the period between 1930 to 1960 as a
golden age for their judiciary, when it functioned independently under a system derived from
French, Turkish and Islamic law.").
129 Dickinson, supra note 5, at 36-39.
130 Id. at 37.
131 Id. at 36-37.
"3 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 46, 50 (2001).
133 Id.
134 id.
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equipment, including furniture, case files, and legal texts.'35 Moreover, judges,
prosecutors, lawyers, and support staff sympathetic to the Indonesian regime,
as well as many who were merely perceived de facto members of the
privileged classes, fled East Timor following the referendum, leaving fewer
than ten lawyers. These remaining lawyers were considered so inexperienced
as to be unfit to serve in the new East Timorese justice system. 36
Although the Iraqi judiciary suffered greatly during Saddam's reign, the
capacity deficit in Iraq, though serious, is not as severe as that faced by East
Timor and Kosovo, both of which saw the vast majority of their trained
personnel flee the country.
After the Ba'athists seized power, the courts gradually came under
government control as Saddam took the power to appoint judges.' Many of
Saddam's appointees were Ba'ath Party members; judges who issued sentences
that displeased him were often fired or imprisoned.'38 The chiefjudge in every
province was expected to demonstrate unwavering obedience to Saddam's
commands. 39 This policy yielded rampant bias and favoritism, "with verdicts
being routinely influenced by payoffs and tribal affiliations."' 40
Although many experienced judges are available in Iraq, the breadth and
scope of the corruption ingrained in the Iraqi judiciary poses a serious
challenge to the establishment of a fair and credible justice system.' 4' Thus,
the capacity-building process necessarily began with the purging of corrupt,
self-serving judges.'42 On June 17, 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) AdministratorL. Paul Bremer, America's top civil administrator in Iraq,
announced the planned formation of the Judicial Review Committee, which
was charged with the task of cleaning up Iraq's judiciary by evaluating the
suitability of judges and prosecutors.'43 Consisting of three Iraqis and three
members of the occupying coalition, the Judicial Review Committee had the
authority to dismiss prosecutors and judges for links to the Ba'ath Party,
135 Id. at 50-51.
136 Id. at 50.
7 Faramarzi, supra note 116.
138 Id.
139 Craig T. Trebilcock, Notefrom the Field: Legal Cultures Clash in Iraq, ARMYLAW., Nov.
2003, at 48, 48.
140 Id. at 49.
141 Id.
141 See id. at 49-50.
143 Iraq: U.S. Announces Plans For Court, Review Committee (Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Inc. broadcast, June 17, 2003), at http://www.rferI.org/nca/features/2003/06/
17062003165953.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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complicity in human rights violations, or corruption." Approximately 25%
of Iraq's judges and prosecutors were dismissed by the committee.145
In addition to the Judicial Review Committee's investigation, there are
other roadblocks that will keep Iraqi judges from trying Saddam. Several
judges thought to be working with the Americans have been assassinated, 46
and many fear that Saddam loyalists will kill them if they preside over any case
against the ousted dictator. 147  This concern further narrows the pool of
experienced and competent Iraqi judges who can try Saddam because some
judges, such as Qasem Ayash, a judge of thirty-two years, have indicated they
will not sit on a tribunal trying Saddam due to fear of retaliation.'"a
Given its recent history, there is a definite need for capacity-building in
Iraq. The question, then, is how to achieve it. The Iraqi Special Tribunal's use
of only Iraqi judges, with international judges available for observation and
consultation, will provide on-the-job training necessary for young prosecutors
and judges who currently know only Saddam's system of justice. The
presence of international authorities will help ensure that the new system
grows in the right direction instead of resembling the justice system under
Saddam. Because most of these cases will likely involve an isolated incident
or short timeframe, Iraqi judges and prosecutors will gain relevant experience
quickly by conducting a large number of relatively short, straightforward trials.
Trying Saddam, on the other hand, will do little to improve the capacity of
the Iraqi judiciary. Saddam's trial will revolve around complex allegations of
genocide, war crimes, and human rights violations.' 49 These are issues that an
4 Id.
145 Department for International Development, DFID Iraq Update No. 77, Mar. 8, 2004,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pr-iraqupdate77.pdf.
"4 See Patrick Cockburn, Judge is Shot Dead as Iraqis' Hatred of Occupiers Grows,
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 5, 2003 (describing the assassinations of two prominent Iraqi judges in
twenty-four hours), http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1105-02.htm.
147 Faramarzi, supra note 116.
1 Id.
"' The complexity of these allegations stems not only from the need to prove systematic
genocidal intent that can be positively linked to Saddam, but also stems from the volume of
evidence that will be used to do so. In March 2004, the Justice Department sent fifty lawyers,
investigators, and prosecutors to Iraq to help prepare a blueprint for Iraqi prosecutors. The case
against Saddam will come from three caches of documents, including the eighteen tons seized
during the Kurdish uprising discussed supra text accompanying notes 23-28. The second cache
is twenty-two cartons of documents and testimony of atrocities collected by the human rights
group Indict. The third cache is drawn from hundreds of thousands of documents seized by
American forces after Saddam's ouster. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, US. Team Is Sent to
Develop Case in Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004.
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Iraqi judge is unlikely to ever see again, unless he participates on an interna-
tional tribunal. Moreover, the time required to conduct such a trial will
necessarily keep those judges from hearing other cases, effectively limiting the
knowledge and experience they gain from sitting on the tribunal.
In addition to presenting complex allegations of genocide, war crimes, and
human rights violations to judges that have no experience in that area,
Saddam's trial may be further complicated by defense tactics. Given its
general lack of experience in international law, the Iraqi judiciary will likely
have a difficult time managing the trial if Saddam challenges the legitimacy of
the U.S.-installed Iraqi government.' Many also believe that Saddam will
attempt to bring "evidence of Western support for his regime before the first
Gulf War, and may even try to call former heads of state like former-President
George H.W. Bush to the witness stand."'' By employing such tactics,
Saddam may undermine the legitimacy of his trial by taking advantage of the
Iraqi judiciary's inexperience.
The Iraqi justice system has a much better foundation than many post-
conflict countries, such as East Timor. There are experienced judges, and
courts are being quickly repaired and restored to operation."5 2 The trials of
hundreds of Iraqi citizens--observed by international figures to ensure
fairness-on various charges of human rights violations will eventually restore
the Iraqi justice system to a position of legitimacy and credibility, but such a
restoration cannot be expected to occur overnight. Instead it will take time to
build up the human resources and physical infrastructures needed for the
weakened Iraqi justice system to recover from years of degradation and
corruption.5 3
Although the Iraqi judiciary needs time and experience to effectuate such
a restoration, it simply does not require the expertise that would be gained
through trying Saddam. It makes little sense to rely on judges from a system
IS0 Phillip Carter, Trying Saddam: Deciding on a Court and the Charges, CNN (Dec. 16,
2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/16/findlaw.analysis.carter.saddam/index.html.
"s' Id; see also French Lawyer Says He Will Defend Saddam, CNN, May 6, 2004 ("Among
witnesses he plans to call to testify, [Saddam's attorney Jacques] Verges said, are Western
leaders who backed Saddam's government during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s."), at http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/28/saddam.attomey/.
1s2 See Council for Arab-British Understanding, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Human
Rights Report 2003, available athttp://www.caabu.org/press/documents/fco-humanrights2003-
iraq.html (last modified Oct. 16, 2003).
113 Fiona McKay, The Trial: Give Hussein Due Process, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 17, 2003,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international-justice/op-ed/mckay-oped.htm.
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of questionable capacity to essentially train themselves when international
figures with experience in trying these cases are available.'54 Shutting out
those figures from Saddam's trial will contribute little to capacity-building
while raising questions as to the legitimacy of the trial.
B. The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Legitimacy
Legitimacy is an extremely important goal that the Iraqi Special Tribunal
must meet. As President Bush himself has acknowledged, Saddam's trial must
be fair and just enough to withstand international scrutiny.'55 However, the
establishment of a domestic tribunal by American forces during an occupation
raises significant questions as to whether the justice delivered by that court
will be seen as fair by the international community of today and the history
books of tomorrow.'56 Without the participation of international judges in
Saddam's trial, there is a serious risk that the Iraqi courts-supported only by
American forces-will be seen as dispensing victor's justice.'57 War crimes
tribunals are often dismissed as exercises in victor's justice, largely due to the
difficulty of prosecuting those who remain in power, l"' thus there is concern
that the trials of deposed leaders are nothing more than show trials with
predetermined outcomes. In failing to better protect against allegations of
victor'sjustice, the Iraqi Governing Council and the United States have greatly
endangered the legitimacy of Saddam's trial.
Legitimacy is an amorphous concept, the perception of which varies greatly
because different communities have their own opinions about what constitutes
legitimacy and what a justice system must do to achieve it.'59 National and
'5 Human Rights Watch, supra note 121 ("[I]ntemational judges and prosecutors [have] a
lot of experience in trying very serious human rights crimes. This experience should not be
wasted.").
's' See, e.g., Primetime, President Bush's Interview with Diane Sawyer (ABC television
broadcast, Dec. 16,2003) [hereinafter Primetime],http://web.archive.org/web/20040202212627/
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime/US/bush-sawyer-excerpts_-1-_031216.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Primetime].
116 Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to the Iraqi Governing Council on 'The Statute of
the Iraqi Special Tribunal', Dec. 2003, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq121703.
htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
tS Slevin, supra note 3.
' Eric Pape, Cleaning House: Sierra Leone's War Crimes TribunalDefiedHistory by Going
After the Victors, not just the Losers, in the Country's Civil War. Rebuilders of Iraq are Taking
Notice, LEGAL AFF., Sept-Oct. 2003, at 69, 69.
"n Dickinson, supra note 5, at 33.
[Vol. 33:273
POOR JUDGMENT
international groups, in the case of Iraq, have incompatible views of what is
necessary to ensure the Iraqi Special Tribunal's legitimacy. Iraq's justice
minister, Hashim Abdul-Rahman al-Shalabi said that"[t]he presence of foreign
judges will undermine [Iraqi] sovereignty and would undercut the value of the
Iraqi judiciary.""'6  Conversely, human rights organizations and activists
believe that the legitimacy of the Iraqi Special Tribunal would be enhanced by
broad international participation. 6' Despite Iraqi assurances that they can
handle a trial of this magnitude, human rights organizations are no doubt
concerned by a UN team's evaluation of Iraq's justice system as "degraded"
in August 2003.162 That team said the system was "not capable of rendering
fair and effective justice for violations of international humanitarian law and
other serious criminal offenses involving the prior regime."
1 63
Questions about the legitimacy of criminal tribunals arise in many different
forms. An empirical study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and
Herzegovina found that a wide cross-section of lawyers and judges from all
ethnic groups was ill-informed about the ICTY, and were suspicious of its
motives and results."6 In Kosovo, several convictions against Serbian
defendants by domestic panels of Albanian judges were later thrown out by
hybrid and international panels due to lack of sufficient evidence and due
process concerns. 65 Similarly, in East Timor, questions were raised whether
individuals who supported only limited autonomy for East Timor under
Indonesian authority-a very small segment of the population-could receive
fair trials under the newly-created Timorese system.'66 The demographics of
these countries-in Kosovo Serbs were largely unrepresented in the judiciary
and in East Timor the vast majority of the population remaining after the
conflict was pro-independence-brought into doubt the ability of a local
justice system to deliver verdicts that would be perceived as legitimate.'67
160 Faramarzi, supra note 116.
161 See, e.g., Slevin, supra note 3.
162 Price, supra note 113.
163 Id.
" Human Rights Ctr. & Int'l Human Rights Law Clinic, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, & Ctr. for
Human Rights, Univ. of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, and Social Reconstruction: An
Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102, 136-40
(2000).
16' Dickinson, supra note 5, at 34; see also David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The
Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 95, 133-34 (2003).
166 Dickinson, supra note 5, at 34-35.
167 Id.
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The Special Court, championed by many human rights activists as a model
the Iraqi Special Tribunal should more closely resemble, is too new to be
evaluated in a similar manner. Thirteen indictments were approved between
March and June 2003, two of which were withdrawn in December 2003
following the deaths of the accused.' Because these trials have only just
begun, it is impossible to judge their future legitimacy. However, unlike the
tribunals for Iraq, Kosovo, or East Timor, the Special Court may give indicia
of its legitimacy through its sentencing because the eleven remaining
indictments include representatives of all three of the country's former warring
factions. 69 Indeed, the Special Court is unlike any other tribunal in that it has
indicted figures on all sides, including the victors.17 Trials before the Iraqi
Special Tribunal will not have such indicia of legitimacy. Instead, the Statute
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal includes a blanket provision prohibiting any
former member of the Ba'ath Party from serving as "officer, prosecutor,
investigativejudge,judge or other personnel ofthe [Iraqi Special] Tribunal."''
This provision only serves to "undermine the legitimacy ... of the [Iraqi]
Special Tribunal. 172
The exclusion of any former Ba'ath Party member from the positions of
officer, prosecutor, judge, or personnel of the Iraqi Special Tribunal under-
mines the legitimacy of the tribunal by providing ammunition for those who
allege the trial is an exercise of victor's justice. The Ba'ath Party was a vast
bureaucracy that remained in power for decades. Saddam, as President Bush
said, "showed no love for the Iraqi people, particularly those that dared express
an opinion other than his.' ' 173 It is certainly conceivable that many Iraqis
joined the Ba'ath Party out of fear, rather than devotion to Saddam. The
Statute recognizes that an Iraqi citizen may be unfit to serve as part of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal due to past corruption or criminal conduct even if they were
not members of the Ba'ath Party.'74 Conversely, an Iraqi may be perfectly fit
168 Cases, supra note 106.
169 Id.
'70 In March 2002, police arrested then Minister of State Security Sam Hinga Norman, a
military hero who helped end the civil war as leader of the Kamajors, a government militia that
defeated the RUF. Pape, supra note 158, at 69.
'T' THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, art. 33.
172 Human Rights Watch, supra note 156 (arguing that former Ba'ath Party members should
be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that "blanket exclusion... undermine[s] the legitimacy
and credibility of the [Iraqi] Special Tribunal").
173 Primetime, supra note 155.
1"4 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECLAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, arts. 5(f), 7(m), 8(f).
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to serve despite his prior membership in the Ba'ath Party. If non-Party
members are subject to individual review, former Party members should be
treated equally by having their suitability "assessed on a case-by-case basis
with regard to their past performance and seniority of their membership in the
Ba'ath Party."' 75
Refusing to offer former Party members the opportunity to participate not
only reduces the pool of qualified personnel by presumably barring dedicated
individuals, it also casts doubt on the credibility of the proceedings by dividing
the country along party lines: the victors on the Iraqi Governing Council try
members of the ousted former regime who, regardless of their level of
participation or seniority, are so corrupt and deceitful that their mere
membership in the Ba'ath Party makes any other inquiry into their fitness
unnecessary. The refusal to consider any former Ba'ath Party member is
especially damaging to the credibility of the Iraqi Special Tribunal because of
broad U.S. influence in the formation of the Tribunal.'7 6 The exclusion,
therefore, may be seen as proof that the United States is less concerned with
justice than with assuring the outcome of the trial.
The legitimacy of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is being questioned by many
due to the role played by the United States in forming the Iraqi Governing
Council, which wrote the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and will pick its
members.' 77 There are twenty-five members of the Iraqi Governing Council,
two of whom are judges, and all of whom were appointed by L. Paul Bremer,
the American CPA Administrator, on July 13, 2003.78 Judge Wael Abdulatif
was "disbarred and imprisoned by Saddam" and Judge Dara Nor al Din, a
former Court of Appeals judge, served eight months of a two-year sentence in
prison after he "held one of Saddam's edicts (confiscating land without proper
compensation) unconstitutional." '179 Most of the members of the Iraqi
Governing Council are noted long-time opponents of the regime, representa-
tives of oppressed groups, and/or were imprisoned or exiled by the
Ba'athists."'8 If, like the members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the Iraqi
"' Human Rights Watch, supra note 156.
176 Malinowski, supra note 8 ("Trials conducted without U.N. authority by Iraqi jurists
selected by the United States will widely be seen as American trials. Indeed, they will smack of
victor's justice.").
'" Slevin, supra note 3.
"7 Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraqi Governing Council, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
govemment/govering__council.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
179 Id.
180 See id.
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Special Tribunal judges are selected exclusively from communities that have
suffered harsh repression under the Ba'ath Party, the tribunal will lose the
appearance of impartiality.
181
There is no specific reason to question the integrity of these individuals, but
it is important to avoid the appearance of impropriety as carefully as actual
impropriety-. "The gravity and scale of the [allegations against Saddam]
underscore[s] the paramount importance that he be brought to justice in a
manner that is unquestionably fair.. '.. The countless victims of decades of
grave violations of human rights by the previous Iraqi government deserve
nothing less."' 82 If the judges conducting Saddam's trial have personally
suffered imprisonment, disbarment, or exile at the hands of the former dictator,
as judges Dara Nor al Din and Wael Abdulatif have, Saddam's trial will be
forever tainted as one of revenge instead ofjustice' 83 Further, many experts
believe that justice dispensed by the Iraqi Special Tribunal will be of
questionable legitimacy regardless of the absence of personal motive. Paul van
Zyl of the International Center for Transitional Justice said, "[a]ny tribunal
established on behalf of the Coalition Provisional Authority will not be able
to rid itself of the perception and the fact that it is an instrument of American
power."' 84
Ultimately, it is impossible for any tribunal to achieve the perception of
legitimacy from every concerned group because of the unique demands of each
community.. Although it is important that the concerns of Iraqis-who, after
all, suffered the most-are addressed, it is more critical that Saddam's trial
achieve the perception of legitimacy from the international community. That
is not to suggest that Iraqi concerns are irrelevant. Ensuring that Iraqis feel
ownership of and informed about the trial should be a priority. However,
legitimacy should not be sacrificed in the name of Iraqi sovereignty. Instead
these two goals must be balanced to the greatest extent possible. Moreover,
a tribunal of Iraqis does not ensure a sense of ownership and perception of
legitimacy from the Iraqi people.
' Malinowski, supra note 8.
182 Press Release, Amnesty International, Iraq: Only Justice Can Serve the Future of Iraq
(Dec. 15,2003), at http://newsamnesty.org/index/engmde 141832003 (last visited Oct. 19,2004).
' See id. ("[I]t is not clear that the independence and impartiality of prosecutors and judges
can be guaranteed in a highly politicized context.").
, Larry Kaplow, Council Plans to Form Iraqi Tribunal: Roadside Bomb Kills Three in
Baghdad on Day Controversial Plan is Unveiled, AUSTIN Am.-STATESMAN, at A5, 2003 WL
56780026.
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Both the Iraqi people and the international community.are concerned about
the CPA's naming of Salem Chalabi as Director General of the Tribunal.8 5
Chalabi is the nephew of Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress
and a member of the Iraqi Governing Council." 6 Ahmed, who reputedly has
close ties to the Pentagon," 7 was exiled from Iraq for decades and was a
prominent critic of Saddam's, while Salem received his legal education in the
United States.' Because Salem, by virtue of his position, named the other
judges on the tribunal,8 9 it is easy to see why this tribunal, composed entirely
of Iraqis, does not have widespread support in Iraq and why some observers
predicted a move to change the court's personnel following the planned
transfer of power to a new government on June 30, 2004.190
The use of international figures who have extensive experience trying war
crimes, sitting alongside Iraqi judges more closely connected to the Iraqi
people, will provide an air of legitimacy that cannot be achieved with a panel
entirely composed of Iraqi judges, who have no experience in this area. That
lack of experience, coupled with the self-assuredness that comes from many
years on the bench, will severely compromise the legitimacy of Saddam's trial
if international judges are not involved. Regardless of their tenure, few, if any,
Iraqi judges have ever tried a case that even approaches the complexity of
Saddam's pending trial.'9 ' Human Rights Watch reports that, "[T]raditionally,
"85 See, e.g., Tom Perriello, Strike Two with Chalabi, CENTERFORAMERICAN PROGRESS, Apr.
23, 2004, at http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=47870.
186 id.
17 See The World Today (ABC Local Radio broadcast, Apr. 22, 2004), at http://www.abc.
net.au/worldtoday/contentl/2004/s1 092663.htm. More recently, Ahmed has fallen out of favor
with the United States after it was discovered that his network provided the Bush administration
with faulty pre-war intelligence reports on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs.
Ahmed was also recently accused of informing Iran that the United States had cracked its
intelligence codes. Meanwhile, Salem, who still heads the tribunal, has been charged in the June
murder of Haithem Fadhil, director general of the finance ministry. Both deny the charges
against them. The United States has distanced itself from the criminal charges, saying they are
sovereign matters for the Iraqi people to handle themselves. Associated Press, Chalabis Deny
Charges, Aug. 9, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,128383,00.html.
"' Bassem Mroue, Judges Chosen for Saddam's Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 21, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/21/iraq/main61306 l.shtml.
189 Id.
190 Id.
91 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Justice Needs International Role (July 15,
2003) ("Few judges in Iraq, including those who fled into exile, have participated in trials of the
complexity that they would face when prosecuting leadership figures for acts of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes."), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/iraq07l503.htm.
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criminal trials in Iraq have been very brief proceedings, lasting only a few
hours, or at most a few days."' 92 Considering that standard, Judge Ayash's
observation that "[t]here's nothing to it. It's like trying any other criminal
case,"'193 is extremely worrisome. The trial of many lower level Ba'ath Party
members may indeed be just like trying any other criminal case. The trial of
Saddam will not. Instead, it will be an extremely lengthy and heavily
scrutinized trial that covers decades of actions and will likely entail years of
trial. 9 4
V. CONCLUSION
The atrocities occurring in and around Iraq during Saddam's reign clearly
justify his trial on charges of war crimes, genocide, and human rights
violations. There is ample evidence that genocidal intent drove the Anfal
Campaign and that citizens of Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran were tortured and
executed.'95 Yet no assumption or belief of guilt, no matter how strong,
justifies the compromise of justice. Whether or not Saddam is, as President
Bush alleges, "a torturer, a murderer... [and] a disgusting tyrant who deserves
justice, the ultimate justice, ' he is still entitled to due process, including apresumption of innocence. 97 Moreover, a fair trial, one that lives up to
192 Human Rights Watch, supra note 121.
'9 Faramarzi, supra note 116.
9 Although it is impossible to know precisely how long this trial will last, a comparison with
the trial of Slobodan Milosevic-former leader of the Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia, and
Herzegovinia in their attempt to create a separate Serbian state-before the ICTY is instructive.
Milosevic is charged with genocide and various crimes against humanity, Geneva Convention
violations, and violations of the laws of war for his actions from 1987 until his arrest in April
2001. The recently-concluded prosecution phase of Milosevic's trial lasted two years, and the
defense commenced its case on August 31, 2004. ICTY at a Glance, Case Information Sheet:
Milosevic Case (IT-02-54) "Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia andHerzegovina ", at http://www.un.org/
icty/glance/milosevic.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2004).
"' See generally Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the
Kurds, July 1993, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanful (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
196 Primetime, supra note 155. Regardless of the perceived legitimacy of the trial, the
sentencing phase will almost certainly engender controversy. The death penalty remains on the
statute book in Iraq and is not expressly excluded by the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
Bush's opinion that Saddam deserves "the ultimate justice" not only appears to prejudge the
outcome of the trial, but also puts the United States at odds with human rights organizations and
the many countries who have banned the death penalty. Zagaris, supra note 1, at 86; Human
Rights Watch, supra note 156.
19 The accused is also guaranteed the right to a public, fair, and impartial hearing; a lawyer
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international standards, is crucial to the demonstration that the new Iraq is
different from Saddam's Iraq. 198
Aside from the opportunity to adjudicate Saddam's conduct as ruler of Iraq,
the Iraqi people stand to gain much through the operation of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal. The Iraqis can show the world that Iraq's future justice system will
not resemble Saddam's. However, such a demonstration is by no means
assured. While the Iraqi Special Tribunal can contribute to a marked
improvement in the quality of the Iraqi justice system, a widespread consensus
that Saddam's trial was fair and legitimate will be extremely difficult to realize
without broader international participation.
The capacity-building benefits of a hybrid tribunal can be achieved through
the hundreds of prosecutions that can be held by the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
These prosecutions, conducted by judges without fear of a dictator, will serve
to rebuild the Iraqi judiciary while allowing the people to heal, to the extent
possible, by seeingjustice brought against their oppressors. However, adding
Saddam to the list of those tried before the Iraqi Special Tribunal will be
counter-productive. While judges struggle with their first and probably last
dose of complex international human rights law, many trials will be delayed
or possibly abandoned as a result of the years spent trying Saddam. Worse yet,
the trial may be labeled a farce, a mere show put on by Americans who had
decided the outcome long before the trial even began.
International human rights groups suggest that the Iraqi judiciary lacks the
institutional competence and credibility to conduct such an important trial.'99
However, many Iraqis believe that broad international participation will
undercut the value of the Iraqi judiciary.2"' In order to achieve the most
widespread perception of legitimacy possible, both Iraqis and experienced
international judges must sit on the tribunal that tries Saddam.
The Iraqi people must understand that collaboration with international
judges need not involve surrendering Iraqi ownership of the trial, and that it is
possible to "craft a solution that would give a central role to Iraqi jurists while
of his or her choice; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; free communication with
a lawyer; trial without undue delay; and challenge the evidence against him or her. THE STATUTE
OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 2, art. 20. Significantly, the Statute "does not
ensure that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Human Rights Watch, supra note
127.
198 Slevin, supra note 3.
199 Carter, supra note 150.
200 Faramarzi, supra note 116.
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at the same time securing meaningful international input., 201 International
figures, on the other hand, must respect the fact that the Iraqis are victims of
Saddam's regime and thus deserve a central role in his trial.202 Despite the
experience gained by international figures while conducting similar trials in
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, Iraqis must play a central
role in the trial in order for it to contribute to Iraqi healing and reconcilia-
tion."' Holding the trial in Iraq and allowing Iraqis to retain this central
role-and applying other lessons learned from the successes and failures of
previous hybrid tribunals-will increase the Iraqi perception of legitimacy
because the trials will be more accessible to the victims and their families.2°
Involving international judges will increase the global perception of legitimacy
by detracting from the perception of victor's justice.
The desire of the Iraqi people to try Saddam themselves is understandable;
they suffered greatly under his rule. However, it is precisely this suffering that
demands the participation of international judges on the tribunal. The Iraqi
judiciary can be rebuilt through the prosecution of low-level Ba'ath Party
members. For the trial of those figures, the Iraqi Special Tribunal has adequate
protections to provide for capacity-building and legitimacy. However, those
protections are not sufficient for Saddam's trial. For his alleged crimes against
humanity, Saddam must sit before international as well as Iraqi judges. A trial
conducted solely by Iraqis will never escape the allegation that it was a mere
kangaroo court whose outcome was determined by Americans before Saddam
was even arrested.
20 Letter, supra note 4.
202 InternationaIjudges and prosecutors on East Timor's tribunal were criticized for wielding
too much power over the process. Dickinson, supra note 5, at 38.
203 See id.
204 Human Rights Watch, supra note 121 ("National judges and prosecutors help create a
feeling of'ownership' of the important process of accountability.").
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